Introduction
The body of beliefs (facts and rules) accumulated in the course of time by a knowledge-based system interacting with a complex and dynamic world is destined to evolve. Some of the newcoming pieces of information integrate and corroborate the previously held corpus of sentences about the world, but others might cause serious conflicts with the established knowledge. In this case, the eventual acquisition of the new evidence should be accompanied by a partial or total reduction of the credibility of the conflicting pieces of knowledge. If the system's collection of beliefs is not a flat set of facts but contains rules, finding such conflicts and determining all the sentences involved in the contradictions can be hard because knowledge is only partially explicit.
Since the seminal, influential and philosophical work of Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson [1] , the ideas on "belief revision" have been progressively refined [2, 3] and ameliorated toward normative, effective and quasi-computable paradigms [4, 5] . In this chapter, we begin by surveying some of the following contributes: 2 Symbolic approaches 2.1 Sentence-based Revision 2.1.1 AGM Revision [1] : respects the logical content of the beliefs but works with infinite sets of sentences 2. [5] [8] : generally, they do not respect the logical content of the sentences 3.1 probabilistic approaches [9] : do not deal with inconsistencies 3.2 possibilistic approaches [10] : lead to a very drastic revision 3.3 evidence-based approaches [11] : are very computationally complex However, in a multi-agent environment, where information come from a variety of human or artificial sources with different degrees of reliability, belief revision has to depart considerably from the original framework. The rationales are discussed in the last section of this chapter, where we also present a model for belief revision applied in practical systems.
Revision as Transmutation of Partial Epistemic Rankings
Along the chapter we will use a propositional language L to represent knowledge. Sometimes we will abandon the original terminology in force of the following notational conventions: 2 Symbolic approaches
2.1
Sentence-based revision information (p) and then the full information (pErrore. Il segnalibro non è definito.q), the partial information should not make a difference.
These axioms describe the rational properties to which revision should obey, but they do not suggest how to perform it. An operative definition came from the Levy's identity, that defines revision in terms of the contraction K -¬p of ¬p from K, i.e., a reduction of K to a point in which ¬p is no longer derivable from K:
Contraction can be characterized in terms of Epistemic Entrenchment, which is an ordering ≤ ΕΕ on the sentences of L that envisages their logical content; it depends on K. p≤ ΕΕ q means that p is less entrenched (more exposed to eventual changes) than q. ≤ ΕΕ satisfies the following postulates:
EE1.
≤ ΕΕ is transitive EE2. For all p, q∈L, if p q then p≤ ΕΕ q EE3.
For all p, q∈L, either p≤ ΕΕ pErrore. Il segnalibro non è definito.q or q≤ ΕΕ pErrore. Il segnalibro non è definito.q EE4.
If K is consistent, then pErrore. Il segnalibro non è definito.K iff Errore. Il segnalibro non è definito.q, p≤ ΕΕ q EE5.
If Errore. Il segnalibro non è definito.qErrore. Il segnalibro non è definito.L q≤ ΕΕ p then p is a tautology EE2 accounts for minimal change: if either q or p must be retracted from K, then it will be a smaller change to give up p rather than q since in order to retract q it will be necessary to abolish p too. Equivalent formulae are equally entrenched hence ≤ ΕΕ is reflexive. Since to retract pErrore. Il segnalibro non è definito.q we need to give up at least one of the two, EE3 says that either p or q has the same degree of epistemic entrenchment than pErrore. Il segnalibro non è definito.q (it must hold also EE2). As a consequence, every couple of sentences p and q are comparable (through pErrore. Il segnalibro non è definito.q). EE4 and EE5 give the lowest degree of entrenchment to formulae that do not belong to K and the highest one to the tautologies.
An epistemic entrenchment specifies a contraction as follows:
qErrore. Il segnalibro non è definito.K -p iff qErrore. Il segnalibro non è definito.K and, either p< ΕΕ qErrore. Il segnalibro non è definito.p, or p is a tautology K -p contains only the formulae of K that have a greater degree of epistemic entrenchment than p.
From an implementational point of view, there are three problems with such kind of revision:
1. it is defined for infinite sets of sentences 2. ≤ ΕΕ depends on K, so it is difficult to iterate the revision because the ordering defined on K * p could be different from the one defined on K Regarding the last problem, the opinion implicitly expressed in the next section is that, practically, such implementable and reasonable metric can be provided only by numerical approaches.
Partial entrenchment rankings
Mary-Anne Williams [5] showed that the first two problems "can be solved in theoretically satisfying ways wholly within the AGM paradigm". She pointed out that belief revision means "epistemic entrenchment revision": the newcoming information transmutes the old epistemic entrenchment into a new one which, in turn, yields a different contraction and, hence, a new revised knowledge space. She defined partial entrenchment ranking (p.e.r.) on a base B for K, a function B:B→ {0,1,…,ω} such that:
PER3. B(p)=ω iff p is a tautology
She proved that a p.e.r B (on B) can be regarded as a specification of a finite epistemic entrenchment (on K=Th(B)).
AGM revision can be iterated by transmuting partial entrenchment rankings. The transmutation is provoked by the income of a consistent and not-tautological sentence p with a degree of firmness i. A transmuted p.e.r.
( )
is defined to be one such that:
where the function degree(x) can be computed by the following algorithm:
She introduced a particular transmutation, called adjustment, that, intuitively, involves minimal changes to B such that p is accepted with degree i.
Adjustment obeys the Dalal's "principle of irrelevance of the syntax" [15] since, if p is logically equivalent to q, then ( )
The problem with it is a matter of complexity. Williams wrote: "a full complexity analysis [of adjustment] is yet to be conducted", but, actually, we would be very surprised if it would be less than exponential in the size of the base.
Revision for finite bases
Nebel [4] considers revision schemes with preference information that has a size polynomial in the size of the base. He defines epistemic relevance ordering an ordering ≤ that stratifies a base B into n priority classes B 1 ,Errore. Il segnalibro non è definito.,B n as follows: Epistemic relevance does not respect the logical contents of the sentences as epistemic and partial entrenchment do. The rationale seems to rely on the logical paradoxes of the material implication: a rule q→p should not necessarily be considered more important than p just because p q→p. Let B j be the union of the highest strata down to the j th one, and let BErrore. Il segnalibro non è definito.p be the set of the elements of B↓p that contain as many sentences of the highest priority as possible: This revision satisfies the first six AGM postulates but is more drastic than BErrore. Il segnalibro non è definito.p. It cuts away (hence the name?) all classes that have a priority equal or lower to the class that is "responsible" for an inconsistency. For this reason one may argue that cut base revision violates the principle of minimal change.
Example
In general, we could adopt various criteria to sort and select the elements of B↓p. Let B'=B' 1 Errore. Il segnalibro non è definito.Errore. Il segnalibro non è definito.Errore. Il segnalibro non è definito.B' n and B"=B" 1 Errore. Il segnalibro non è definito.Errore. Il segnalibro non è definito.Errore. Il segnalibro non è definito.B" n two consistent subsets of B where B' i =B'Errore. Il segnalibro non è definito.B i and B" i =B"Errore. Il segnalibro non è definito.B i . Benferhat et al. [17] suggests three ways to translate an epistemic relevance ordering on B into a preference relation « on 2 B .
• best-out ordering. B"« S bo B' iff the most credible of the sentences in B\B" is more credible than the most credible of the sentences in B\B'. This ordering is complete and its maximal elements are all the consistent subsets of B that contain B j , where j is the lowest index such that B j is consistent.
• inclusion-based ordering. Katsuno and Mendelzon [6, 18] showed that every revision satisfying all the eight AGM postulates implies the existence of a total preordering ≤ Κ on Ω such that all the models of K have the same highest priority (lowest position in ≤ Κ ) w.r.t those interpretations that do not belong to [K] ; revision selects the models of p which are closest to those of K w.r.t. ≤ Κ , i.e.:
≤ Κ sorts interpretations while ≤ ΕΕ orders sentences, but they are very closely related: 
Revision as Numerical Treatment of Uncertainty
The knowledge space of a complex knowledge-based system does not suffer only from inconsistency; it can also be affected by imprecision/vagueness (for instance: "The President has not been prolific") and uncertainty (for instance: "Perhaps the President has only a daughter"). Fuzzy logic [19] is a well known way to deal with imprecise properties and relations. In this chapter we do not deal with vague knowledge, but we survey some of the most important frameworks for reasoning under uncertainty. Our goal is that of finding a reasonable way to sort sentences or interpretations according to their degree of certainty in order to direct the change imposed by the inconsistencies. Numerical distributions of credibility over sentences or interpretations play the same role that ≤ ΕΕ , p.e.r., ≤ Κ and epistemic relevance play in the symbolic frameworks. Generally, numerical approaches do not respect logical dependencies among the sentences.
Logics of uncertainty often represent the knowledge space K and the incoming information p in terms of their models, called "possible worlds". It is supposed that [K] contains the world that corresponds to the real one, but we don't know which world it is. However, not all the worlds in [K] are equal candidates to represent the real one, hence each of them is associated with a "weight" d(ω) that expresses its degree of realism. Hence, a knowledge space is represented not simply by 
3.1
The probabilistic framework
The probabilistic approach has been the starting point, and still is a widely accepted reference, for the treatment of uncertainty [9, 20] . The knowledge space is characterized by a probability measure P on 2 Ω , whose fundamental property is additivity: ∀A,BErrore. Il segnalibro non è definito.Ω, AErrore. Il segnalibro non è definito.BErrore. Il segnalibro non è definito.Errore. Il segnalibro non è definito. Errore. Il segnalibro non è definito. P(AErrore.
Il segnalibro non è definito.B) = P(A)+P(B). P(Ω)=1, so if A=Ω-A then P(A)+P( A)=1.
We might also consider the probability distribution p(ω) that assigns a probability degree to each world in Ω, where
signifies that, certainly, ω is not a possible world. p(ω)=1 means that ω is surely the real world. An incoming information AErrore. Il segnalibro non è definito.Ω changes the probability measure of any subsets B of Ω through the Bayes' Conditioning Rule, which can also be expressed in terms of probability distribution:
This modification is defined only for P(A)>0, hence it is not applicable when A is judged impossible by the previously determined probability measure P. Bayesian conditioning obeys the principle of priority to incoming information; it increases the probability of the not impossible worlds belonging to A to the prejudice of those external to A which become impossible.
Example. Suppose to known that in a basket there are only apples (a), or only bananas (b) or only pears (c). K={(a∧¬b∧¬c)∨(¬a∧b∧¬c)∨(¬a∧¬b∧c)}, Ξ={a,b,c} and Ω contains eight possible worlds. Suppose that the current knowledge space is characterized by the probability distribution p(ω) reported in the table. Let ¬a be the incoming information, i.e. A={ω 4 , ω 6 , ω 7 ,
5, so the probability distribution is modified as reported in the row p(ω|A). Lewis developed a probabilistic rule that deals with the principle of minimal change (see [8] ). It moves the "masses" associated to the worlds outside the newcoming information to those inside which are closest to them according to some metric defined over Ω. This means that if ωErrore. Il segnalibro non è definito.A, then its weight p(ω) is added to the world ω Α Errore. Il segnalibro non è definito.A closest to it. If ωErrore. Il segnalibro non è definito.A, then ω Α =ω. This rule, called "imaging" is defined as:
. It can change an impossible world into a possible one, i.e. one may have p A (ω)>0 while p(ω)=0, and it can turn a sure fact into an uncertain one, i.e. one may have P A (B)<1 while P(B)=1.
Example. In the previous example the only world outside A that belongs to [K] (i.e., has a probability different from 0) is ω 5 . Adopting as metric the number of literals with different sign, among the worlds belonging to A the closest to ω 5 is ω 8 .
Errore. Il segnalibro non è definito.
Jeffrey extended the Bayesian approach to the case that the newcoming information is uncertain, hence relaxing the principle of priority to the incoming information. A is attached with a probability α. The probability measures on 2Errore. Il segnalibro non è definito. are modified as follows:
The worlds belonging to A become more probable but less (Errore. Il segnalibro non è definito.<1) than in the certain case, while the worlds outside A that were not considered impossible become less probable but still not impossible.
Example. Suppose that A is affected by a degree of uncertainty α=0.7. A={ω 1 ,ω 2 ,ω 3 ,ω 5 } and P( A)=0.5. The new probability distribution is p A (ω|(A,α)).
The worlds that were considered impossible are still absolutely improbable, but the worlds outside the newcoming information still have a degree of probability.
I
Let us turn from the semantic connotation of knowledge spaces to the syntactic one.
In the probabilistic framework the probability of a sentence p is simply the probability measure P ([p] 
3.2
The possibilistic framework
In the possibility theory [8, 10, [21] [22] [23] ] the knowledge space is represented by a possibility distribution π:Ω→[0,1]. π(ω)>π(ω') means that ω is more plausible than ω'. π(ω)=0 signifies that ω is an impossible world, while π(ω)=1 does not mean that ω is the real world, as in the probabilistic framework, but only that nothing hampers it to be so. In Ω there can be many worlds with π(ω)=1 and the property of additivity does not hold. A knowledge space is: N(A),N(B)) . A is certain when N(A)=1. The possibilistic approach captures the idea of total ignorance under the form of the vacuous knowledge space for which Π(A)=1 ∀AErrore. Il segnalibro non è definito.Ω; this is not possible in the probabilistic framework since even if we assign the same probability p(ω)=1/|Ω| to each world in Ω, the probability associated to each set A (i.e. to each proposition of the language) will be proportional to |A|. 
I
The possibilistic approach can be extended to the case that the incoming information A is uncertain, i.e. N(A)<1. Such uncertainty can be interpreted in two ways:
1. N(A)=α is regarded as a constraint for the revised distribution π', that must satisfy N'(A)=α; 2.
N(A)=α is regarded as an extra piece of information that may be useful or not to refine the current knowledge space; α is considered a degree of priority of A.
Interpretation 1 is in the spirit of Jeffrey's rule and its correspondent rule is defined as:
otherwise where * stands for min or Errore. Il segnalibro non è definito. depending on the fact that π(ω|A) is ordinal or Bayesian. The constraints N(A)=α imposes that after the revision Π(A)=1 and Π( A)=1-α, which means leaving a possibility to the worlds outside A. The worlds inside A are revised as A would be certain, while those outside A are revised as the incoming information would be A, but the possibility values are reduced of (1-α).
Interpretation 2 leads to consider A as a fuzzy-set F whose membership function is defined as µ F (ω) =1 if ωErrore. Il segnalibro non è definito.A
=1-α otherwise
The possibility distribution changes as follows:
where * stands for min or Errore. Il segnalibro non è definito.. As before, the worlds inside A are revised as it would be sure and the others have a possibility degree other than zero.
Example. Let us consider the example for possibility revision but with a certainty degree α=0.6 for A. They hold Π(A)=0. This revision is drastic since it rejects all the sentences (p i ,α i ) with α i <α, even if they were not involved in the derivation of any inconsistencies, and replaces them with (p,1). The result is the same produced by a revision based on epistemic entrenchment or on Best-Out ordering.
A less drastic revision scheme is based on the choice of preferred subsets of B that fail to imply (¬p,α) for any α>0. We may take advantage of the ordering to make the selection of the preferred subbases that will be in turn ordered by a inclusionbased or lexicographical scheme, as described in section 2.1.3. However such revision schemes cannot be expressed at the semantic level.
3.3
The belief-function framework Example. Suppose that Ω={ω 1 ,ω 2 ,ω 3 }.
2 The incoming information AErrore. Il segnalibro non è definito.Ω changes the values of credibility and plausibility of the subsets of Ω. In terms of credibility, revision follows the "Geometric Rule of Conditioning":
The subsets disjoint from A will become incredible. This rule is not applicable when Bel(A)=0, i.e. when A is incredible.
Example. In the previous example, suppose that A={ω 1 ,ω 2 }. Bel(A)=0.5, so we can apply the Geometric Rule of Conditioning.
2 Ω {ω 1 } {ω 2 } {ω 3 } {ω 1 ,ω 2 } {ω 1 ,ω 3 } {ω 2 ,ω 3 } {ω 1 ,ω 2 ,ω 3 }
This framework deals also with uncertain inputs. They are treated as new bpas on the elements of 2 Ω . The change will consist of merging the two evidence (the prior and the new) about the same real situation. Given a frame of discernment Ω and the two bpas m 1 and m 2 , the new combined bpa is defined by the following Dempster Rule of Combination: This rule reinforces concordant evidence and weakens conflicting evidence. It can be applied only if the evidence are independent and referred to the same frame of discernment. Because of the commutativity of the product, the rule is independent from the sequence of the pieces of information, so it violates the principle of priority to the incoming information. The main problem with the Dempster-Shafer approach is its computational complexity. One should generate a frame of 2 |Ω| elements! However, much work has been done in approximate techniques with statistical methods as the Montecarlo sampling algorithm [25] . 4 Revision in a Multi-Agent Environment
In belief revision, the credibility ordering of the sentences (or of the models) plays a very important role. Whether it is qualitative, as in the symbolic approaches, or quantitative, as in the numerical methods, belief revision always depends on it and on its eventual change after the incoming information.
With the exception of the belief function formalism, all the presented approaches recognize the rationality of the "priority to the incoming information" principle.
We believe that, in a Multi-Agent scenario where many sources refer about a same static situation, three points have to be highlighted:
MA1. the way the credibility ordering is generated and revised must reflect the fact that beliefs come from different sources of information, since the reliability and the number of independent informants affect the credibility of the information and vice-versa; the belief revision system must deal with couples <piece of information, informant> rather than with information alone [16] MA2. the traditional principle of "priority to the incoming information" is not acceptable since there is no strict correlation between the chronology of the informative acts and the credibility of their contents [26] ; it seems reasonable to treat all the available pieces of information as they had been collected at the same time MA3. the agents must be able to recover a previously discarded piece of knowledge after that new evidence redeems it [27] ; for each cognitive state K, and sentences p and q such that p∈K and p∉K * q, there can always be another piece of information r such that p∈(K * q) * r, even if r p. An obvious case should be r=Errore. Il segnalibro non è definito.q A rejection of the incoming information not necessarily leaves unchanged the knowledge space since, in general, the incoming information alters the credibility ordering. As a consequence of this alteration, a different selection of preferred sentences might result, and one might reconsider some previously discarded pieces of knowledge. So, in order to make practical and useful belief revision in a multiagent environment, we replace the priority to the incoming information principle with the following one:
• principle of Recoverability: any previously held piece of knowledge must belong to the current knowledge space if consistent with it
The rationale for this principle is that, if someone gave a piece of information and there is no reason to reject it, then we have to accept it! This is stronger than the traditional "coherence" soul of belief revision, since the piece of knowledge to accept is not a generic sentence of the language but a generated piece of information; somewhere there is an utilitarian intelligent source that guarantees for it.
This principle does not hold for updating. The term "revision" here means "dealing with a new broader set of pieces of information". Our sentence-based model for belief revision considers two knowledge repositories:
the knowledge background KB, which is the set of all the atomic propositions available to the reasoning agent; since it can be inconsistent, it cannot be used as a whole to support reasoning and decision processes 2.
the knowledge base BErrore. Il segnalibro non è definito.KB, which is the maximally consistent, currently preferred piece of knowledge that should be used for reasoning and decision supporting; since it is maximally consistent, it may contain pieces of knowledge with low degrees of credibility.
We substitutes the eight AGM postulates with the followings: S4 might choose a base B' syntactically equal to the previous one, B (meaning that p has been rejected) but, in general, B' will have a different credibility distribution than B. p might be rejected even if S4 chooses a base B' different from B, but that still contains sentences incompatible with p.
When p is consistent with B, not necessarily B'=BErrore. Il segnalibro non è definito.{p}, since S3 may yield a totally different choice at S4. Previously rejected pieces of knowledge R⊂KB can be rescued simply by determining some upsetting between the credibility of a set S⊂B and the credibility of R, this may happen if p supports R against S. The rejection of the priority to the incoming information principle implies that K * 4 and K * 5 hold no longer (if p is inconsistent it will be part of none of the goods produced at S2, so it will never be part of a base). S1, S2 and S5 deal with consistency and derivation, and act on the symbolic part of the information. Operations are in ATMS style; to find out nogoods and goods, we adopt (and adapt) the most efficient set-covering algorithm that we are aware of [28] . Notwithstanding this, even in the propositional case, determining all the minimal inconsistencies can be very hard. However, such condition can be relaxed (the consequence is that some of the goods are not really consistent) and in practical applications dealing with commonsense knowledge (for instance [29] ), such minimal inconsistencies are provided interactively by the User. S3 and S4 deal with uncertainty and work with the numerical weight of the information. Both contribute to the choice of the revised knowledge space so their reasonableness should be evaluated as a couple. Numerical formalisms are able to perform both of them since the credibility of a single sentence p is determined in the same way as the credibility of a set of sentences B by the weights attached to [p] and [B] , respectively. Flexibility is an advantage in separating the two steps; for instance, depending on the characteristics of the knowledge domain under consideration and the kind of task and/or decision that should be taken on the basis of the revision outcome, the selection function could consider also one (or a combination) of the methods described in [17] .
Probabilistic methods with uncertain inputs seem inadequate for the strong dependence that they impose on the credibility of a sentence and that of its negation. The "drowning problem" is a limit of the possibilistic approach (see [17] ). We see that the belief-function formalism, in the special guise in which Shafer and Srivastava apply it to auditing [30] , could work well because, treating all the pieces of information as they had been provided at the same time, it fulfills R * 5. The method has the following I/O:
list of couples <source, piece of information> list of couples <source, reliability> OUTPUT: list of couples <piece of information, credibility> Let S={s 1 ,…,s n }be the set of the sources, and let kb i be the subset of KB received from s i . Each source s i is associated with a reliability R(s i ), that is regarded as the probability that the source is faithful. The main idea with this multi-source version of the belief function framework is that a reliable source cannot give false information, while an unreliable source can give correct information; the hypothesis that s i is reliable is compatible only with the models of kb i , while the hypothesis that s i is unreliable is compatible with the overall Ω. Each source s i is an evidence for KB and generates the following bpa m i on 2 Ω : From the combined bpa m, the credibility of a sentence p of L is given, as usual, by:
From this mechanism we obtained an easy way to calculate the new reliability of the sources. Let Φ be an element of 2 S . If the sources are independent, the reliability of
. Maybe that some source fall in contradiction, so that some elements of 2 S are impossible. The remaining elements are subjected to a bayesian conditioning so that their reliability sum up again to 1. The revised reliability R * (s) of a source s is the sum of the new reliability of the surviving elements of 2 S that contain s. If a source has been involved in some contradictions, then R * (s)≤R(s), otherwise R * (s)=R(s).
The main problem with this formalism is its computational complexity. Contradictions help us because they reduce the size of Ω. However, to cancel an impossible world, we must first generate it. This imposes severe limits on the number of sentences acceptable in input (about 30) even for "off-line" applications. Yet, from an input-output analysis of the mechanism we realized that two properties hold.
1. Sentences not involved in contradictions and received from a single source s, do not contribute to the mechanism, in the sense that the degrees of credibility of the other sentences do not depend on their presence. Their own credibility is R * (s). 2. Multiple contradictions involving sentences received exclusively from exactly the same sources are redundant; all the sentences from the same source receive the same degree of credibility, independently of the number and the cardinality of the contradictions.
The property (1) implies that we can temporarily leave out of the process those sentences received from a single source that are not involved in contradictions. In many cases, this dramatically reduce the size of Ω. The property (2) says that, what is important is that a set of sources was contradictory, not how many times nor about what or about how many sentences they did. This allows us to temporarily leave out of the process also some sentences involved in contradictions; this is significant in situations like that of two sources systematically in contradiction only with each other.
S4 translates such ordering on the sentences in KBErrore. Il segnalibro non è definito.{p} into an ordering on the goods of KBErrore. Il segnalibro non è definito.{p}. The best classified good is selected as the preferred revised knowledge base. If the ordering on KBErrore. Il segnalibro non è definito.{p} is not strict, then there can be multiple preferred goods. In this case we could take their intersection as revised knowledge base ( [17] ); however, the intersection is not maximally consistent and this means that all the conflicting pieces of knowledge with the same credibility will be rejected.
Another question is: S4 should consider only the qualitative ordering of the sentences in KBErrore. Il segnalibro non è definito.{p} (relative classification without the numerical weights) or could take advantage of the explicit ordering (numerical weights). The first approach seems closer to the human cognitive behavior (which normally refrains from numerical calculus). The second one seems more informative (takes in count not only relative positions but also detachings). In our model we do not use the "best-out" ordering for its "drowning effect" [17] . The lexicographic one could be justified by some particular application domains (e.g. diagnosis). The inclusion-based method seems the most reasonable since it eliminates always the least credible one among conflicting pieces of knowledge.
As an example of a numerical way to perform S4, ordering the goods according to their average credibility seems reasonable and easy to calculate. With this method the preferred good may not contain the most credible sentence.
In the belief function framework, a "good" g is an element of Ω, precisely the one in which all the sentences in g are considered "true" and all the sentences out of g are considered "false". This implies that the belief-function formalism is able to attach directly a degree of credibility to g, bypassing S4 in our framework. However, in [26] we prove that if a good contains only part of the information supplied by a source, then its credibility is null. This is unreasonable and, unfortunately, the event is all but infrequent, so that often the credibility of all the goods is null.
S5 is not particularly significant since, theoretically, it simply consists in applying classical entailment on the preferred good to deduce plausible conclusion from it. We adopted an ATMS and we stored each sentence derived by the Theorem Prover with an origin set [31] , i.e., a set of basic assumptions which are all necessary to derive it. Practically, the last step consists in selecting from the derived sentences, all those whose origin set is subset of the preferred good. We could relax the definition of origin set to that of a set of basic assumptions used to derive the sentence. This is easier to compute and does not have pernicious consequences; the worst it can happen is that, being this relaxed origin set a superset of the real one, it is not sure that it will be a subset of the preferred good as the real one is, and so some derived logical consequences of the preferred good may be not recognized (at first).
Besides recoverability, this computational model for belief revision overcomes various limitations of other classic approaches, in particular:
• the revision can be iterated • inconsistent incoming information does not yield inconsistent revised knowledge spaces • the numerical revision is performed on a broader base (the overall KB) • the revision is more flexible; for instance, the incoming information could be rejected even if it is consistent with the current knowledge base • the complete numerical ordering renders the revision as least drastic as possible
